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Introduction
A decision maker who is uncertain about her tastes tomorrow will be reluctant to commit to a decision today. This situation is naturally modeled as a choice problem over menus of alternatives. Today, the decision maker must choose a menu -an action that will determine the alternatives available tomorrowand the uncertainty about future tastes leads to a preference for flexibility: the decision maker may strictly prefer the union of two menus A and B to either A or B alone. Kreps (1979) uses a setting with choice over menus to characterize a decision maker who desires flexibility. In his representation, the decision maker foresees a set of subjective states S. Each subjective state s ∈ S is interpreted as a possible taste for tomorrow, in the form of a ranking of alternatives represented by a state dependent utility function u (·, s) . The decision maker foresees that once a subjective state is realized, she will pick the alternative x that maximizes u (x, s) over the available alternatives in the menu.
In the context of such a representation, we can identify every menu A with the vector (max x∈A u(x, s)) s∈S of maximal utilities achieved in each subjective state. The comparison of menus can be reduced to the comparison of these vectors. The overall utility of menu A will depend on how these coordinates are aggregated. In Kreps' model, the decision maker is characterized by a strictly increasing aggregator. Kreps also shows that in a setting with a finite number of alternatives this aggregator can always be taken to be additive, where the utility of a menu A is given by
s).
This can be interpreted as the decision maker having a belief π over the possible states in S, and evaluating each menu A according to its expected indirect utility under π. We can omit π from the equation above because these beliefs are not identified uniquely. The key assumption in Kreps' representation is that preferences over menus are ordinally submodular: whenever the union of two menus A ∪ B is indifferent to A, the union A ∪ B ∪ C must be indifferent to A ∪ C for every menu C.
One interpretation of this assumption is that, if the extra flexibility allowed by the alternatives in B are of no value when added to the menu A, then those alternatives must also be of no value when added to the larger menu A ∪ C.
This paper shows that ordinal submodularity can be dismissed while retaining all the main elements of Kreps' model, if we allow the decision maker to aggregate indirect utilities with a (weakly) increasing aggregator. The main result is that any numerical representation for a preference over menus that is monotonic, in the sense that A is at least as good as B whenever A ⊃ B, can be rewritten as
where S is interpreted as a set of subjective states, just as before. Note the similarity to the previous representation, in which we substituted the (weakly) increasing aggregator min s∈S for the strictly increasing aggregator Σ s∈S .
In constrast to Kreps' model, our decision maker can be seen as evaluating each menu according to the worst possible scenario for the realization of the subjective state s ∈ S. This implies that there is no belief π over subjective states that can explain her choices as following the expected indirect utility criterion.
In fact, she exhibits an attitude towards ambiguity which is similar to the one in the multiple priors model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) . This paper shows that, while all monotonic preferences over menus can be represented by a decision maker who is uncertain about future tastes, the ordinally submodular (and only the ordinally submodular) admit an expected indirect utility representation. Ergin (2003) has previously shown in a finite setting that one can dismiss ordinal submodularity in the presence of costly contemplation. He introduces a function that measures the psychological cost faced by the decision maker if she has to contemplate her tastes before making a choice. The model becomes equivalent to Kreps (1979) when this cost is removed, i.e., when the decision maker can contemplate her tastes without incurring any psychological cost. When the main result of this paper is applied to the finite setting, we allow for the violation of ordinal submodularity without introducing contemplation costs. Instead, we modify the requirement that the aggregator be strictly increasing, requiring only that it be increasing. This suggests a pessimistic attitude towards subjective uncertainty, rather than costly contemplation. Therefore, in a finite setting, it is impossible to conclude that the decision maker faces contemplation costs based on the failure of ordinal submodularity alone. A discussion of the different interpretation for how failures of ordinal submodularity arise in each model will be presented in Section 4, after the application of the main result to extend Kreps' representation in Section 3.
The idea that a decision maker may face uncertainty with respect to her own future tastes and may also exhibit ambiguity aversion with respect to that uncertainty is not new. Epstein et al. (2007) characterize such an agent in a model of coarse contingencies, while Ergin and Sarver (2009) use this idea to study preferences for the timing of resolution of objective uncertainty. Cerreia-Vioglio (2009) uses a related representation to characterize convex preferences over objective lotteries. This paper shows that the scope of this idea to represent monotonic preferences is much broader. In the papers mentioned above, the representation is obtained in particular settings where the choice objects have additional structure (lotteries and menus of lotteries), and under additional assumptions on the preference relation. None of this is needed for the main result of this paper, which is presented next.
General Preference for Flexibility
Let Z be an arbitraty set of choice objects and let X ⊂ 2 Z \ {∅} be a collection of non-empty menus containing Z. A preference over menus is given by a binary
A function U : X → R is a numerical representation for whenever for all x, x ∈ X we have x x if and only if U (x) ≥ U (x ). The following result shows that we can rewrite any numerical representation for a monotonic preference over menus in minimax form over a set of subjective states.
Theorem 1. Every numerical representation U : X → R for a monotonic preference over menus can be rewritten as
for some set of subjective states S and some state-dependent utility index u :
Proof. Since U represents it must be bounded above, attaining its maximum at Z, the largest menu. Assume without loss of generality that U (X) = 0.
Take S = X and for each menu s ∈ S let I s : Z → R be the indicator function defined by I s (z) = 1 if z ∈ s and I s (z) = 0 otherwise.
Note that for any s ∈ S we have max z∈x u(z, s) equal to U (s) whenever x ⊂ s and equal to zero otherwise. Also whenever s ⊃ x we have s x and therefore
Hence the right-hand side of (1) is a well-defined function of x and for all x ∈ X we have
Note that Theorem 1 is silent on the existence of a numerical representation.
The conditions for the existence of a numerical representation are well-known.
For completeness, consider the following restatement of Theorem 1:
by (1) if and only if it is complete, transitive, monotonic,
and has an order-dense countable subset.
Proof. Follows immediately from Theorem 1 and Fishburn (1970) , Chapter 3, Theorem 3.1.
Representation (1) can be interpreted as follows. The decision maker chooses a menu today as if she were unsure about what her ranking of the alternatives in Z will be tomorrow. She can foresee a few possibilities represented by the subjective state space S. Each element s ∈ S renders a utility index z → u(z, s) representing a possible ranking over the alternatives in Z. The decision maker exhibits ambiguity aversion with respect to this subjective uncertainty. In other words, she is extremely pessimistic when evaluating which subjective state will occur when she chooses a particular menu.
There is a strong parallel between representation (1) and the multiple priors model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) . In the multiple priors model the state space is objectively described. In contrast, here the state space is subjective, unobserved and obtained as part of the representation. But we can retain the interpretation of the decision maker's attitudes towards uncertainty of the multiple priors model.
To see this formally, interpret each menu x ∈ X as an act f x : S → Z × S that delivers a payoff f x (s) = (arg max z∈x u(z, s), s) which depends on the realization of the state s ∈ S. The realization of the state s ∈ S is uncertain, and the individual fails to have a unique Bayesian prior µ ∈ ∆(S) over the possible realizations of the state. Instead she evaluates each act x ∈ X according to
which is the well-known functional form in the multiple priors model. The set of priors is the entire simplex ∆(S), which corresponds to an extreme form of ambiguity aversion. This connection will help us interpret the generalization of the model of preference for flexibility by Kreps (1979) in the next section.
Finite Environments
In this section we explore the consequences of Theorem 1 in settings where the set Z of choice objects is finite. Let X = 2 Z \ {∅} be the collection of all nonempty menus formed from objects in Z. Consider the following axioms on the preference ⊂ X × X:
Axiom (A1). Weak order: is complete and transitive.
Axiom (A2). Monotonicity:
Axiom (A3). Ordinal submodularity:
A1 is standard and allows a numerical representation in this finite setting.
A2 can be interpreted as the decision maker never valuing commitment, and allows preference for flexibility. A3 is also referred to as additivity. Kreps (1979) characterizes the preference relations that satisfy all of the above. 
Lemma 3 (Kreps
This representation suggests that the decision maker chooses a menu x by taking into account a set of possible subjective states S. For each subjective state s ∈ S there is a corresponding utility index z → u(z, s) representing a ranking over the alternatives in Z. The decision maker anticipates that once a subjective state s ∈ S is realized, she will choose the alternative z ∈ x that maximizes u(·, s).
The value max z∈x u(z, s) can be seen a state-dependent indirect utility function for the menu x. The ex-ante utility of menu x is the sum of the state-dependent indirect utilities. Note that the representation in (2) can be re-written as an expectation with respect to a probability measure over the space of subjective states S. For example, multiplying U in (2) by 1/|S|, where |S| denotes the cardinality of S, we obtain an expected indirect utility representation where the subjective states are equiprobable. This suggests that the decision maker has a prior over the subjective state space, and evaluates the menus using an expected indirect utility criterion. But in this finite choice environment it is impossible to pin down a unique probabilistic belief over the subjective states. Different probability weights can be given to each subjective state in (2) by rescaling the corresponding utility
The content of Kreps' representation is ordinal. The summation over states operator in (2) can be replaced with an aggregator of the vector of second period indirect utilities, as long as this aggregator is strictly increasing in each of its coordinates. As the next result shows, this property is intimately related to the ordinal submodularity axiom.
Proposition 4. satisfies A1 and A2 if and only if there exist a finite set of subjective states S and a state dependent utility index u : Z × S → R such that is represented by
Proof. Since Z is finite, X is finite and under A1 admits a numerical representation V : X → R. Apply Theorem 1 to rewrite V as in (3). Note that in the proof of Theorem 1 we take S = X, so S can be taken to be finite. Example 1. Consider the decision problem of an individual who needs to buy a car presented in Ergin (2003) . The alternatives are Mercedes, Lexus and Toyota, and accordingly we write Z = {m, l, t}. We observe her preferences over car dealerships, given by {m, l, t} {l, t} {m, t} ∼ {t} {m, l} ∼ {l} {m} which satisfy A1 and A2 but not A3. In this case an additive representation as in (2) is not possible, but it is easy to find a representation as in (3). Define S = {s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , s 4 } and let u : Z × S → R be summarized by
it is easy to check that V : X → R defined as in (3) with these choices of S and u represents this . ♦
The example above shows how preferences that satisfy A1 and A2 but violate A3 can be represented using Proposition 4. Of course, even when the preference satisfies A3, it still admits a representation as in (3). This raises the question of what distinguishes the two representations (2) and (3) of a preference that satisfies all three axioms. The next result shows that, at least when the set of choice objects is finite, such a distinction cannot be based on a comparison of the underlying subjective state spaces.
Proposition 5. satisfies A1, A2 and A3 if and only if there exist a finite set of subjective states S and a state dependent utility function u : Z × S → R such that is represented at the same time both by U as defined in (2) and by V as defined in (3).
Proof. We proceed with the construction of S and u : Z × S → R as described in the proof of Theorem 1 in Kreps (1979) . Recall that in Kreps' construction S is a subset of X and for each s ∈ S we have u(z, s) = a(s) if z ∈ s and u(z, s) = 0 otherwise, where a(s) are negative numbers. Without loss of generality, we can pick all a(s) to be strictly negative integers. We obtain the representation given in equation (2).
The key to the proof is to note that if we replace any state s 0 ∈ S with n new states s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s n and for each new state s i and each z ∈ Z we define u(z, s i ) = u(z, s 0 )/n, the value of U (x) for any x ∈ X in equation (2) We thus have for any x ∈ X,
so the representation still works with the new set of subjective statesS and state dependent utilityũ. We can interpret this procedure as effectively 'splitting' a subjective state s 0 into n smaller pieces that, when added together, amount to the original state. In fact, we have
and all we are doing is substituting the left hand side for the right hand side of this equation in the representation (2). Note that this 'splitting' procedure can be applied again to any subjective state in the new representation. The rest of the proof consists in applying this procedure repeatedly.
Since S ⊂ X and X is finite we can partition S into ∼-equivalence classes S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S m where for any z ∈ S j and z ∈ S k we have z z if and only if j ≥ k. Consider the mapping s → j(s) where to each s ∈ S we assign the number j(s) ∈ N such that s ∈ S j(s) . We can extend the map j to all of X in the natural way so that j represents . Note that j(x) ∈ N for all x ∈ X hence the map x → −1/j(x) also represents . We now proceed to apply the procedure repeatedly: begin with S 1 , the ∼-equivalence class of -least preferred elements of S. For each of the original states s ∈ S 1 apply the procedure above using n = |a(s)|. Note that the value of n will depend on the particular s ∈ S 1 and that for all newly created states s and any z ∈ Z the value of u(z, s ) will be either zero or −1.
Now proceed "upwards" through the ∼-equivalence classes, applying the splitting procedure to all original states in each equivalence class. Each time the 'splitting' procedure is applied to a state s ∈ S j choose n = |a(s)| × j so that the value of u(z, s ) for each newly created state s is either zero or −1/j.
Since applying the 'splitting' procedure does not change the value of U , it still represents . Define V as in equation (3) and with an argument similar to the proof of Proposition 4 it is easy to show that V (x) = −1/j(x) for all x ∈ X and therefore V also represents .
Since in this last proof we effectively split each subjective state s ∈ S into several new states, the number of subjective states in the representation of Proposition 5 is larger than that of Proposition 4. There is an alternative approach that maintains the same number of subjective states. Instead of 'splitting' each state into smaller pieces, it consists of 'normalizing' state-dependent utilities so that u(·, s) equals either zero or −1/j(s) for each s ∈ S and adding probability weights to the representation in (2) so as to keep the value of U (x) the same for every x ∈ X.
We now state the generalization of Kreps (1979) Proof. Sufficiency is easy and left to the reader. Necessity follows from Proposition 4, noting that u : R S → R given by u(a) = min s∈S a s is increasing. Comparing this result to Theorem 1' of Kreps (1979) , or to Proposition 5, we conclude that A3 holds if and only if a strictly increasing aggregator exists.
Pessimism Versus Costly Contemplation
The present characterization allows us to interpret failures of ordinal submodularity as the result of aversion to subjective ambiguity. Ergin (2003) presents a characterization in which failures of ordinal submodularity are related to costly contemplation. Of course it is impossible to distinguish the two models based solely on the ranking over menus . To better compare the models, consider again the preference over car dealerships presented in Example 1. It is easy to check that this preference fails ordinal submodularity. Adding the Mercedes m to the menu that contains only the Toyota t leaves the individual indifferent, so that {t, m} ∼ {t}. But adding the Mercedes to the the menu that contains both the Lexus l and the Toyota t leaves the individual strictly better off: {t, l, m} {t, l}.
In Ergin (2003) this failure of ordinal submodularity arises because the decision maker finds contemplation of her own preferences costly. The individual does not know if she finds it worthwhile to pay more for the extra features of a Lexus or a Mercedes, compared to the cheaper Toyota. In order to distinguish between these two possibilities, the individual must incur a psychological cost of contemplation. When only the Mercedes and the Toyota are available, the individual finds the cost too high compared to the possible benefit. The Mercedes is too expensive, and it is very unlikely that, if she engages in costly contemplation, she will find the added features of the Mercedes worth the extra cost. She chooses the Toyota and does not engage in costly contemplation, which leaves her indifferent between {t} and {t, m}. For this decision maker, the Lexus is a different matter. Although it is expensive, she finds it more likely that, once she engages in costly contemplation, she may end up choosing the extra features in the Lexus. Hence when Lexus and Toyota are available, she finds it worthwhile to pay the contemplation cost. Once she decides to engage in costly contemplation, she may find out the Mercedes is the best option after all. Hence when both Lexus and Toyota are available, the addition of the Mercedes constitutes welcome flexibility. In other words, {m, l, t} {l, t}.
In contrast, in the representation proposed in Example 1 there is no cost associated with contemplation. The individual can distinguish between any two subjective states without incurring any psychological cost. She foresees four different subjective states, but she is uncertain about the likelihood of each state.
Moreover, she has no confidence in any given probabilistic belief about the ocurrence of each state. Adding a Mercedes to the dealership that only has Toyota has no value, since it offers no protection in s 2 , the worst case scenario. But adding the Mercedes to the dealership that has both Lexus and Toyota offers full protection agains subjective uncertainty: no matter what subjective state is realized, one of the favorite options will always be available.
Formally, the costly contemplation model and the present model extend the model in Kreps (1979) in different ways. While Ergin (2003) adds a contemplation cost function, the present model weakens the requirement that the aggregator be strictly increasing. Ordinal submodularity will hold in a costly contemplation model if and only if it is possible to find a representation with a zero contemplation cost function. It will hold in the present model if and only if it is possible to find a representation with a strictly increasing aggregator.
Conclusion
This paper has shown that whenever a preference over menus of choice objects can be represented numerically and satisfies monotonicity, the numerical representation can be rewritten in minimax form. This result allowed us to generalize the model of preference for flexibility in Kreps (1979) , by relaxing the ordinal submodularity assumption. As we have seen, every complete, transitive and monotone preference admits a representation in terms of a subjective state space, a state dependent utility function and an increasing aggregator. In this context, ordinal submodularity is equivalent to the existence of a strictly increasing aggregator. This allowed us to interpret failures of ordinal submodularity as an extreme form of ambiguity aversion with respect to subjective uncertainty.
